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Motivation 
• DoD and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) leverage 3rd party service 
compositions to outsource infrastructure and services. 
• What sort of data do they want?  
• What will they do with my data once they have it?  
• What am I willing to give them? 
 
• In prior work: we studied actions for collection, use and sharing [RE’15] 
• What about data retention? 
[RE’15] T. Breaux, D. Smullen, H. Hibshi, “Detecting Repurposing and Over-collection in Multi-Party Privacy 
Requirements Specifications.” IEEE 23rd International Requirements Engineering Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 
pp. 166-175, Sep. 2015. 
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Data Retention Actions 
• Redaction 
• Directly remove some type of data from a collection. 
 
• Perturbation 
• Don’t directly remove a specific type of data, just reduce the quality of the data, or 
remove specific data points. 
 
• Data Append 
• Combine disjoint data to infer something, create a new type of data. 
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Running Example 
• Cyber threat information sharing portal. 
• A cyber threat clearinghouse and DoD contractor have recently 
crafted a data sharing agreement that enables them to collaborate to 











Data shared with CTC.








Network activity capture logs
Threat information, mitigation strategy.
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Technical Approach 
• Eddy; formal language with 
semantics based on 
Description Logic (DL). 
• Specify and analyze data 
flows. 
• Use this as a tool to 
measure how specified 





Eddy Language Structure 
• Two sections; header section, policy section. 
 
• Define data, actors, purposes in header. 
• All concepts can have sub-concepts described through DL subsumption. 
• Can have equivalent concepts described through DL equivalence. 
 




1. Analyze policy text to extract requirements, code into Eddy: 
 
“All O-2 or higher service members  the and from 
in order to complete a 
. This must be done to  with standing orders.” 
SPEC HEADER 
SPEC POLICY 
  authorization_form FROM  FOR 
Modal phrase indicates . action keyword. Coll ction . 
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Using Eddy 
2. Tool compiles Eddy into Description Logic: 
 
• name ⊑ authorization_form 
• rank ⊑ authorization_form 
• p1 ≡ COLLECT ⨅ ∃hasObject.authorization_form ⨅ 
∃hasSource.network_analysts ⨅ ∃hasPurpose.assure_compliance 
• p1 ⊑ Obligation 
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SPEC HEADER 
 ATTR NAMESPACE "http://gaius.isri.cmu.edu/example.owl" 
 ATTR DESC "This is an example policy for medical data, written in Eddy." 
 P treatment > diagnosis, prescription, blood-tests 
 D patient-labs > bloodwork 
 A medical-professional > phlebotomist, doctor, nurse 
 A laboratory > phlebotomist 
SPEC POLICY 
 P COLLECT bloodwork FROM phlebotomist FOR treatment 
 P COLLECT bloodwork FROM laboratory FOR treatment 
 P USE bloodwork FROM phlebotomist FOR marketing 
 P USE patient-labs FROM phlebotomist FOR anything 
 P USE bloodwork FROM medical-professional FOR diagnosis 
 R USE bloodwork FROM medical-professional FOR anything 
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Further Extending Eddy for Data Retention 
• Redaction means to remove data elements from a dataset. 
• Redaction is useful as a data minimization strategy when data cannot be 
shared, or when it can be pared down to the minimum necessary. 
 
These are paper redactions, but we can redact data from digital sharing, too. 
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Further Extending Eddy for Data Retention 
• Data append refers to a general class of methods that link two or more 
data elements together. 
 
• By prohibiting data append, downstream parties are bound to limit the 
use of a redacted dataset; cannot combine to recreate original. 
 
• Fixed requirement for the data prior to sharing, assuring disjointness 
from other datasets post-transfer to a third party. 
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Further Extending Eddy for Data Retention 
• Perturbation refers to a general class of methods that introduces 
statistical inaccuracies into data; conforms to statistical profile of original 
data; 
• Changing data values. 
• Removing values. 
• Adding new values. 
 
• Eddy language does not assume that data perturbation is implemented 
by any particular method. 
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Experimental Design 
• How do data append, redaction and perturbation systemically affect data 
subject unanticipated disclosure? 
 
• Microsimulation [Lov16]; a technique for analyzing real-world situations 
based on synthetic data. 
• Combine with data sharing agreement profile (Eddy specification). 
• Perform analysis. 
[Lov16] R. Lovlace, “Spatial Microsimulation in R”, CRC Press, 2016. 
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Why Generate Synthetic Datasets? 
• Third-party suppliers want to see the technology works before sharing 
their data. 
• De-anonymized datasets for public release lack the sensitive data we 
want to protect in our analysis. 
 
Our Approach: 
• Empirically motivated, micro-simulation based on Monte Carlo to achieve 
technical realism. 
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How to Sample Data Retention Specifications? 
• Based on randomly sampling from the population of data retention 
agreements expressed in the extended Eddy.  
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Sampling Data Retention Specifications 
• Requires expert analysis to perform data segmentation; 3 steps. 
1. Examine captured data. 
2. Determine what data is associated with a threat. 
3. Determine what data is extraneous. 
 








Proposed Evaluation Metrics 
• Categorical re-identification approach proposed by [Swe02]. 
• Number of possible results (threats) proportional to uniqueness of threat 
with respect to data attributes. 
 
• Threat employed by one organization easier to identify compared to 
threat used by many organizations. 
• Threat associated with one individual easier to identify compared to 
association with many individuals. 
[Swe02] L. Sweeney, “k-Anonymity: a model for protecting privacy”. International Journal for Uncertainty in Fuzzy 
Knowledge Based Systems, 557-567, 2002. 
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Proposed Evaluation Metrics 
• Dataset is queried to match threat information with likely threat. 
 
• The results of this query will be possible threats. 
 
• Probability of correct identification, given threat is identified; 
• 𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟)  
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Conclusions, Lessons Learned 
• Synthetic data generation process requires aggregate data, deep 
knowledge of data characteristics. 
• Designing evaluation functions to determine data utility is bound to 
queries on data that are being executed. 
 
• Tension between business value derived from data and risk of 
unanticipated disclosure of confidential information. 
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Conclusions, Lessons Learned 
• Impossible to measure or predict impact of data retention actions without 
knowing how data will be used. 
 
• System integrators/acquisition specialists must recognize that both data 
and queries on data have confidentiality risks built in. 
 
• We have proposed a method to calculate and engineer confidentiality 




• Use machine learning to augment and/or replace expert judgement in 
data segmentation process. 
 
• Reduces the need for personnel to analyze the data, instead it can be 
broken up into categories automatically. 
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Future Work 
• Specification enforcement mechanisms; 
• Prevent data from being used in unspecified way, rather than check conformance. 
 
 
• Seed data with predictable data points that show evidence of 
unauthorized uses. 
• Feedback mechanisms; 




• Specification enforcement mechanisms; 
Would allow integrators/analysts to: 
• Take control of how 3rd party services use downstream data. 
• Evaluate whether to use a 3rd party service based on whether it is truthful about 
specified data practices. 
 
• Allows enforcement of new requirements for 3rd party based on analysis; 
• Can force redaction of certain sensitive data,  
• Prevent data mixture with respect to classification levels, or data types,  
• Require data to always be combined. 
